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n a surprising volte face at his meeting in Moscow with President Putin on September 3rd, 
President Serzh Sargsyan of Armenia agreed to join the Russian-dominated customs 
union with Kazakhstan and Belarus. Thus, in one short meeting, he scrapped the draft 
Association Agreement with the EU, which included a ‘Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement’ (DCFTA), whose negotiation over the past three years had advanced to the point 
that its initialling was firmly scheduled for the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 
November. And, at the same time, the Armenian President chose to deprive his country of 
the possibility to enter into free trade area agreements with other states, which any economy 
is free to do unless it is part of a customs union, in which case it becomes bound to a 
common external tariff.  
This latter deprivation is particularly serious in Armenia’s case, since Russia’s external tariff 
is on average rather highly protective. In the process, Sargsyan has also precluded Armenia 
from pursuing the only plausible strategy to become an open, highly-skilled, small economy, 
following for example the model of Israel, with which it shares several features in common. 
More broadly, it is worth noting that most of the world’s top-ten economies by GDP per 
capita, from Luxembourg to Singapore, are small but completely open countries.  
The economic case against joining the Russian customs union is all the greater because 
nothing in the DCFTA with the EU would have prevented Armenia from entering into a 
‘high-quality’, free trade agreement1 with the Russian-led customs union. Armenia is already 
party to the matrix of CIS free trade agreements, but many of these do not function well. 
Rather than join the Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia customs union, why should Armenia 
not simply negotiate a high-quality free trade agreement with it?  
President Sargsyan has offered two main explanations for his baffling behaviour: Armenia 
depends on Russia to guarantee its security and its large diaspora in Russia make it natural 
for the two countries to have a close economic relationship. One might challenge the first 
explanation by noting that no other collective security arrangement, e.g. NATO, requires its 
member states to join a customs union led by the principal nation.  
                                                   
1 ‘High quality’ means free trade with no exceptions. The concept is now explicitly developed in South-East Asia 
by some ASEAN countries with New Zealand, and forms a core principle of the newly emerging Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP).  
I
2 | EMERSON & KOSTANYAN 
 
As regards the Armenian diaspora in Russia, their remittances are indeed important to the 
Armenian economy and will remain so until it becomes dynamic enough to induce its 
émigrés to return home. During the period of very tense Russian-Georgian relations before 
their 2008 war, discriminatory measures were employed by the Russian police against 
Georgians in Russia. Armenia is vitally concerned that its people are not similarly mistreated 
in Russia. But again, the linkage with the Russia-led customs union is entirely gratuitous and 
logically unnecessary. For example, both Norway and Switzerland are completely integrated 
into the EU’s labour market and there is the free movement of people throughout the 
European Economic Area. But the EU sees no need to put pressure on these countries to join 
its customs union, and both Norway and Switzerland are free to pursue their own trade 
policies with third countries.  
Russian control of gas imports to Armenia may be a further explanatory factor in President 
Sargsyan’s decision. He will surely have observed how Russia uses energy supplies as an 
instrument of coercive foreign policy in both Ukraine and Moldova.  
There are other recent developments that may shed light on Russia’s behaviour towards 
Armenia. On August 13th President Putin made his first visit to Baku in many years, which 
resulted in contracts for the supply of Russian military hardware to Azerbaijan, amounting 
to $4 billion. Azerbaijan itself is greatly expanding its military spending on the basis of its oil 
and gas revenues and one frequently discerns in the country’s political discourse a strong 
determination to get the settlement it wants over Nagorno-Karabakh, preferably by 
negotiation, but if necessary, by force. Meanwhile Russia has a military base in Armenia. 
Thus Russia is conspicuously arming Armenia’s enemy while at the same time pressuring it 
to join the customs union. The precise terms of the Sargsyan-Putin conversation on this 
matter are not publicly known but left to the imagination. 
On the other hand, there are perceptions in Armenia that the EU, while deepening its civil 
cooperation with Armenia through the Eastern Partnership, has done precious little to ease 
the country’s vulnerable geo-political and geo-economic situation. For example, it has urged 
Armenia to close its nuclear power station without offering alternative energy solutions. And 
it has had no perceptible influence over Azerbaijan with a view to resolving the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict or over Turkey on the issue of opening the Armenian-Turkish border for 
normal transport links. 
But this Armenian story is only a part of a grander Russian campaign to also dissuade 
Ukraine and Moldova from signing their DCFTAs with the EU. Russia has a long track 
record of using pseudo technical barriers to trade as instruments of political pressure. On 
September 11th, Russia changed tactics from threat to action by banning all imports of 
Moldovan wine. Overnight Russian officials transformed what had been an enjoyable 
alcoholic beverage into a “health hazard” for the entire Russian population. Georgia has 
suffered similar actions against its wine and sparkling waters at various times in recent 
years. Currently Ukraine, which routinely is targeted with long customs delays, has been hit 
with the latest bijou of Russian trade diplomacy: Ukrainian chocolates have suddenly been 
declared a “health hazard” for the whole of the Russian-Kazakh-Belarus customs union! 
Such actions are contestable at the WTO unless the justification for them is transparent and 
scientifically proven, which signals another problem: Russia may think that it, as a new 
member of the WTO, can overrule the rules whenever it has a political interest to do so. .  
Moreover, the status of the customs union itself is still uncertain. It cannot be recognised by 
the WTO or brought under WTO rules since Kazakhstan and Belarus are not yet members of 
the WTO. Kazakhstan is negotiating accession, but whether it accepts Russia’s WTO-bound 
tariffs as its own is not yet clear. It has signalled that it would like to revise these rates 
downwards for itself and the whole customs union. Also Kyrgyzstan, which is already a 
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WTO member, is considering joining the customs union, but this would mean raising its 
WTO-bound tariffs and thereby entail compensating third countries, which it can hardly 
afford. More profoundly for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian republics, it 
would mean serious tariff barriers with their even-larger neighbour, China, thus certainly 
causing an increase in the cost of living, since Russia is not a competitive supplier of the 
goods they import from China. While for the EU’s Eastern partners the optimum formula is 
to have high-quality free trade with both the EU and Russia, for the Central Asian states 
there is the equivalent case for free trade with both Russia and China, or at least as liberal 
trade with China as they feel is in their best interests.   
President Putin is thus doing all he can to expand his customs union with coercive measures, 
denying the economic interests of the targeted states for more open economic relationships 
with the rest of the world, and with the EU in particular. Kazakhstan, while a founding 
member of the customs union, resents the high level of Russian tariffs it was forced to adopt. 
In short, a triple disaster is in the making on the European continent: destruction of the EU’s 
benign neighbourhood policy, poisoning of Russia-EU relations and construction of a 
disastrous Russian neighbourhood policy. Why disastrous? For the EU and EU-Russia 
relations, it is obvious enough. But how might it harm Armenia, or Moldova or Ukraine? 
Because the Russian strategy is built on two fatal foundations: first, it would cut off the new 
member of the customs union from the freedom to develop an open competitive economy in 
the 21st century’s world of globalisation, and second, it would have been built on crude 
hegemonic geo-political coercion. In combination, they are a recipe for resentment and 
ultimately failure.  
Georgia was thought to have been sufficiently immunised against Russian pressures to join 
the Russian-led customs union. Recently, however, Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanashvili has 
created some confusion by saying that he would consider whether the customs union would 
be in Georgia’s interests. This would mean overturning the country’s fundamental 
achievement of becoming completely economically open to the whole world. His remarks, 
however, were quickly followed by official statements that Georgia’s European and Western 
priorities were not in question. It seems that the Prime Minister was addressing some would-
be diplomatic remarks towards Russia, which were reported out of context and should not 
be over-interpreted. 
What can be done? On September 11th, Commissioner Stefan Füle voiced his concerns before 
the European Parliament acknowledging “enormous pressure being brought to bear” on 
some of the EU’s Eastern partners. The Commissioner declared: “Let me be clear: the 
development of the Eurasian Economic Union project must respect our partners' sovereign 
decisions. Any threats from Russia linked to the possible signing of agreements with the 
European Union are unacceptable.” These include citing the misuse of energy prices, 
artificial trade obstacles, military cooperation and security guarantees and the 
instrumentalisation of protracted conflicts as unacceptable (see “Commissioner Füle 
statement to EP Plenary on the pressure exercised by Russia on countries of the Eastern 
Partnership”, 11/09/2013 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-687_en.htm).  
The EU now needs to follow up its statement by intensifying its support for Armenia, 
Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia with a strong information campaign. It needs to explain why 
the Russian strategy is so dangerous, addressing these arguments to all democratic forces, 
both political parties and civil society, within the partner states, and notably within 
Armenian society.  
The EU has already started preparations to help Moldova overcome the Russian ban of its 
wines. In his remarks to the European Parliament, Commissioner Füle reported that he and 
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the Commissioner for Agriculture “intend to look into the possibility of being able to further 
increase the wine quota for Moldovan exports to the EU”. 
These multiple disasters could be avoided, with benefits to all parties. Russia could expand 
the reach of its new customs union by entering into high-quality free trade agreements with 
the states that want also to have DCFTAs with the EU. In addition, Russia and the EU could 
open discussions over a free trade agreement between the customs union and the EU itself. 
These steps would be worthy of such expressions as our common European home, where the 
aim should be the establishment of a common economic space from ‘Lisbon to Vladivostok’ 
(Putin’s idea). Russia should be willing to make a concordat with the EU, best starting 
tomorrow, to develop mutually supportive and non-coercive policies towards their common 
neighbours, rather than insist on playing 19th century zero-sum games of geo-political 
competition, forcing a choice upon our neighbours who would like good relations with both 
EU and Russia.  
What has to be hammered home to those unsure of the economic arguments is that you do 
not have to have an exclusive customs union to enjoy deep integration for goods, services, 
people and capital, and of course even less for hard security relationships. High-quality free 
trade agreements are the logical instrument for those who want excellent relations with more 
than one big neighbour.  
